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As a world-historical event that has become indelibly etched into the conscience of 
humanity, the Rwandan genocide unequivocally merits scholarly attention to establishing its 
death toll. The historical record demands it. Preserving the memory of the victims, recognizing 
the enormity of the crime, and attributing full responsibility to the perpetrators are also 
compelling reasons to account for the lives taken. Justice also demands it. 
Yet in the twenty-five years since the genocide, dramatically divergent claims have 
emerged in respect of two fundamental aspects of the death toll: the number and the identity of 
the victims. How many Rwandans were killed? And how many of them were Tutsi, and how 
many Hutu? If one examines the claims for the overall number killed, at the higher end lies the 
figure of 1,074,017 Rwandan dead. This number originates with the Rwandan government which 
conducted a nationwide census in July 2000, six years after the genocide.1 Toward the lower end 
lies an estimate from Human Rights Watch, one of the first organizations on the ground to 
investigate the genocide, of 507,000 Tutsi killed.2  
Differences in the claims concerning the victims’ ethnic identities are even more stark. In 
the Rwandan government’s census, 93.67% or just over one million were Tutsi.3 In contrast, two 
                                                        
1 Government of Rwanda, Dénombrement Des Victimes Du Genocide: Rapport Final (Kigali: Ministère de 
L'Administration Locale de L'Information et des Affaires Sociales, 2002). Higher estimates for the death toll exist. 
For instance, the Student Genocide Survivors’ Association (AERG in French) estimated 1,952,078 victims. The 
Government of Rwanda has not officially endorsed this figure. See 
https://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/read/5288, accessed 15 June 2019.  
2 Alison Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (Human Rights Watch; International Federation 
of Human Rights, 1999), 17.  
3 The government’s genocide census distinguished “declared” from “enumerated” victims. A victim is enumerated 
only if the enumerator obtained responses for all questions on the questionnaire. The enumerated figure is slightly 
lower at 934,218 victims. The report is ambiguous, however, as to whether the 93.67% refers to the declared or 
enumerated total. The estimate of over one million Tutsi dead is based on the declared total. If the enumerated total 
is used, the figure becomes 875,000 Tutsi dead.  
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contributors to this forum, Davenport and Stam, have in the past contended somewhere 
between 250,000 and 890,000 Rwandans were killed and suggested – among other possibilities – 
it is possible as few as 50,000 of them were Tutsi and as many as 540,000 of them Hutu.4 If their 
claim that more Hutu were killed than Tutsi is true, this would invite us to revise the common 
characterization of the violence as a genocide solely against Tutsi.5 It implies there may have 
been a double genocide or additionally a politicide, where individuals were targeted for their 
political beliefs rather than their ethnic identity.  
In this article, I present an estimate of between 491,000 and 522,000 Tutsi killed in the 
period 6 April to 19 July 1994 within Rwanda. I take care to delimit this estimate both temporally 
and spatially and to specify it refers only to Tutsi. There have been other periods of major 
violence in which Rwandans – both Tutsi and Hutu - lost their lives throughout the 1990s and 
the 2000s. Moreover, some of this violence occurred outside of Rwanda, in the wider Great 
Lakes region and most notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The genocide and its 
death toll then could be understood in this broader historical and regional context as these other 
episodes of violence were not unrelated.6 Adopting a wider lens, however, should not alter our 
understanding of the fact that a genocide occurred between April and July 1994 inside Rwanda.7 
Nor should it lessen the moral responsibility or negate the agency of those who organized and 
participated in it. The genocide remains a shocking and tragic world-historical event in which the 
intensity and speed of the violence, and the scale of civilian participation, distinguished it. 
Nonetheless, situating the genocide and its death toll in this broader context has merit insofar as 
it serves to underline that the life of every Rwandan taken through such violence deserves to be 
remembered and accounted for. Memory and justice cannot be selective.8  
                                                        
4 Christian Davenport cites a 2010 source jointly-authored with Allan Stam in a 2014 blog entry where these 
estimates are listed. See http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2014/10/24/measuring-denying-trivializing-deaths-in-
the-case-of-rwanda/, accessed 15 June 2019. In a 2012 Powerpoint presentation, Stam presented a different overall 
death toll of between 200,000 and 1,250,000 (slide 25) and presented a different possible Tutsi victim count of 
206,000 and, as a plausible Bayesian-based estimate, a different possible Hutu victim count of 408,000 (slide 18). 
The presentation is available on a project website listing Stam and Davenport as the principal investigators. See 
https://genodynamics.weebly.com/presentations.html, accessed 15 June 2019.  
5 In the BBC documentary Rwanda: The Untold Story (2014), Stam states (at minute 30.33): “If a million people died in 
Rwanda in 1994, and that’s certainly possible, there is no way that the majority of them could be Tutsi.” 
6 For an overview of the various episodes of violence in the Great Lakes in the postcolonial era, and the linkages 
between them, see Omar Shahabudin McDoom, "War and Genocide in Africa's Great Lakes since Independence," 
in Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies, ed. Donald Bloxham; A. Dirk Moses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
7 Rwanda’s Organic law 08/96 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of 
Genocide or Crimes against Humanity defines a genocide victim and sets temporal boundaries from 1 October 1990 
to 31 December 1994. While there is scholarly disagreement as to when the genocide was first planned, it is 
generally recognized that a state-sponsored policy to eliminate all Tutsi was not implemented until almost 
immediately following president Habyarimana’s assassination on 6 April 1994 and ended with the crossing of the 
interim government and government soldiers into then Zaire and the establishment of a new government by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front on 19 July 1994. 
8 This point is powerfully made by Scott Straus, "The Limits of a Genocide Lens: Violence against Rwandans in the 
1990s," Journal of Genocide Research 21, no. 4 (2019). 
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What is it at Stake in Establishing the Genocide’s Death Toll 
 
Both the politics and the emotions surrounding the genocide have provoked and shaped the 
debate over its death toll. The number and the identities of those killed have become intensely 
politicized questions in large part because they evidently drive the characterization of the 
violence. Did the violence targeting Tutsi constitute genocide, the crime of crimes, or something 
less morally egregious? Should the killing of Hutu be seen as morally less reprehensible or 
equivalent? The number and identities of the victims then have become weapons in the battles 
waged between those who would deny, minimize, or equate the genocide with other violence, 
and those who would insist on its moral uniqueness.  
These issues are politicized, however, in part because they are also central in another 
morally charged debate. They shape our perceptions of who were the victims and the aggressors 
in the violence. When the asymmetry in the loss of life is stark, the side with the higher civilian 
casualty count will be more likely viewed as having victim group status; the side that sustained 
fewer civilian casualties more likely to be seen as the belligerent. Recognition of victim status 
confers distinct political advantages. It elicits sympathy and induces guilt in those who failed to 
prevent and stop the violence. Both sentiments may be converted into rhetorical and material 
support for the victim group. It may also grant the victim group some measure of immunity 
from criticism as critics risk being compared to the original perpetrators.9 In contrast, aggressor 
status is politically disadvantageous. It erodes legitimacy and casts doubt on claims of self-
defense and any other pretensions of a just cause to the violence. Aggressors must be held to 
account and punished for their misdeeds. More generally, contestation over victim status 
functions to reduce the complexity of the violence into the basic binary division between good 
guys and bad guys; and contestation over the victims’ identities latently functions to maintain 
ethnicity as a politically salient force in society.  
The contestation is not, however, driven solely by competing political logics and 
strategies. Discussion of genocide also evokes powerful emotions. It stirs feelings of anger, 
grievance, guilt, remorse, and even fear. Affect, as social psychologists have long established, 
biases judgements and evaluations.10 Emotions, alongside politics, then represent another force 
that distorts and obfuscates the true death toll. Disputes over the number and identity of the 
                                                        
9 See Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship," African Affairs 103 (2004): 177-210, 
where he argues the post-genocide Rwandan government skilfully exploited a “genocide credit” to silence criticism 
of itself.  
10 See Dacher Keltner and Jennifer S Lerner, "Emotion," in Handbook of Social Psychology, ed. Susan Fiske, Daniel 
Gilbert, and Gardner Lindzey (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), 317-352. 
 4 
victims in genocides should be anticipated. Scholars would do well then to set clear standards for 
evaluating the competing claims that they know will be made. I begin then by proposing some 
criteria I believe should be considered when generating, and also evaluating, estimates for the 
victims of genocide. These guidelines should certainly not be seen as the definitive word on the 
subject. Rather, they should be considered part of an evolving conversation. Better criteria will 
be developed in time.  
 
Towards Some Guidelines for Establishing Genocide Death Tolls 
First, as already suggested, the violence whose toll we are seeking to establish should itself be 
carefully delimited. At a basic level this requires setting temporal and spatial boundaries. The 
more complex challenge are the conceptual boundaries. Multiple violent events may occur within 
the same temporal and spatial limits but these events may comprise conceptually distinct forms 
of violence. In Rwanda, a genocide against Tutsi unambiguously occurred between 6 April and 
19 July 1994. However, other types of violence also took place: the assassinations of moderate 
Hutu and Tutsi political elites; retributive killings of Hutu civilians by the RPF; personal score-
settling among ordinary Rwandans; and combatant deaths on both sides of a civil war. 
Conceptually subsuming all this violence within the label genocide not only reduces important 
complexity; it weakens the recognition of these other lives lost.  
Second, there should be a degree of transparency in the data and methods sufficient to 
be able to replicate and verify the estimate. The methodological assumptions and choices should 
be set out and the data relied upon made available upon request. Third, a reasoned judgement on 
the reliability of the data chosen and the suitability of the method selected should be offered. As 
a basic standard, the author of the estimate should explain why they opted for their particular 
data and, insofar as they are independent of the data, their methods too. If the data were chosen 
because no alternatives were available to the author, this should be made clear. As a higher 
standard, and a more complex task, the author should offer a judgement on the potential biases 
in a data source. Competing data sources should not be presented as equally reliable if there is 
reason to believe bias may exist. Establishing estimates should not be simply a matter of 
calculating an average across data sources. This rewards biased outliers. 
  Finally, the author should endeavour to situate their claim among the better-known 
estimates already published to help the reader gauge how close it is to these others. Consensus-
building is an important part of the process of establishing the historical record.  
 
Methods and Data 
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Generally, two methods are commonly followed in establishing the genocide’s death toll: 
counting the dead or counting the survivors. Notwithstanding the method chosen, the reliability 
of all estimates depends on two crucial numbers: the number of Tutsi in Rwanda on the eve of 
the genocide; and the number of Tutsi who survived the genocide.  
 
How Many Tutsi Lived in Rwanda Before the Genocide?  
According to the 1978 and 1991 population censuses, there were 467,587 and 597,459 Tutsi 
resident in Rwanda respectively at the time they were conducted. Tutsi then represented 9.8% 
and 8.4% of the population.11 If we extrapolate from these figures to April 1994 using the 
historical average population growth rate specific to each of Rwanda’s eleven administrative 
prefectures, this would mean there were between 714,000 and 647,000 Tutsi in Rwanda just 
before the genocide. However, it has been claimed that both censuses significantly 
underestimated the Tutsi population.12 Two reasons are usually given. First, the Habyarimana 
government (1973-1994) may have purposely understated the Tutsi population in order to justify 
ethnic quotas it had introduced in the 1970s to reverse the longstanding over-representation of 
Tutsi in educational institutions and the civil service. Second, some Tutsi may have identified 
themselves as Hutu to census enumerators to avoid state-sponsored discrimination during the 
Habyarimana era.  
At first glance, the colonial census data appear to support the contention that the two 
postcolonial censuses underestimated the Tutsi population. Tutsi represented 16.7%, 17.5%, and 
16.6% in the 1933, 1952, and 1956 censuses respectively.13 However, a good part of the 
difference between the colonial and postcolonial periods is explained by the exodus of tens of 
thousands of Tutsi during and soon after the Hutu revolution (1959-62) that ushered in 
Rwanda’s independence. A 1964 UNHCR census estimated 336,000 refugees, mainly Tutsi, had 
fled to Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, and Tanzania.14 Rwanda’s population stood at 2,634,000 in 1959 
                                                        
11 See Government of Rwanda, Récensement Général De La Population Et De L'habitat: Résultats Définitifs (Kigali: Bureau 
National de Récensement, 1978); Récensement Général De La Population Et De L'habitat Au Août 1991: Résultats Définitifs 
(Kigali: Ministère du Plan, 1994). The Tutsi proportion is calculated as a percentage of the population of Rwandan 
citizens only. If non-Rwandans were included, the proportions would drop slightly to 9.7% and 8.3% for 1978 and 
1991 respectively.    
12 See for example Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994 : History of a Genocide (London: Hurst and Company, 
1995), 264. 
13  For the 1933 data, see Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers : Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in 
Rwanda (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), 98. For the 1952 data, see Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story : Genocide in 
Rwanda, 40. For the 1956 data, Filip Reyntjens, Pouvoir Et Droit Au Rwanda: Droit Public Et Évolution Politique, 1916-
1973 (Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, 1985), 28. 
14 Cited in André Guichaoua, Le Problème Des Réfugiés Rwandais Et Des Populations Banyarwanda Dans La Région Des 
Grands Lacs Africains (Geneva: United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 1992), 20. 
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which would mean, at most, 461,000 Tutsi (17.5%) were resident in Rwanda prior to the 
revolution.15 If the UNHCR census is accurate, projecting forward to 1994 would mean there 
would have been only some 350,000 Tutsi in Rwanda on the eve of the genocide. As the national 
census, already believed to be an underestimate, puts the Tutsi population at 597,000 in August 
1991, this figure is implausibly low. Either the UNHCR data are unreliable, the 1959 population 
data are inaccurate, or else tens of thousands Hutu also went into exile with Tutsi. Whatever the 
reason, it appears dependence on the colonial-era data, which may have been reliable, to estimate 
the postcolonial Tutsi population depends on other data whose reliability is more questionable. 
An alternative method for establishing the Tutsi baseline pre-genocide would be to 
examine locally-collected administrative population data. These local data offer two advantages 
over the national census data. First, they were collected more frequently, often several times per 
year, allowing us to observe any unusual changes in the trend. Second, individuals were less likely 
to be able to misrepresent their ethnicity. Before the genocide, each of Rwanda’s 145 
administrative communes maintained registers of births, deaths, and migrations based on 
information provided either by the administrative cell heads (responsables) or else by the heads of 
blocks of ten households (nyumbakumi). These local administrative figures, who lived within the 
community, typically knew members personally and it would have been very difficult for a Tutsi 
family to pretend it was Hutu. The data in these commune registers were then used by each of 
Rwanda’s eleven prefectures to produce annual administrative census reports. 
How reliable are these local censuses? Local data collection capacity may well vary 
between localities and over time. I analysed the reported data in two localities and over 8 distinct 
time periods to probe their reliability. During fieldwork in 2003 I found in prefecture archives 
the original population reports for 1965, 1975, 1983, 1985, and 1988 for Butare prefecture, in 
which Tutsi represented 18.3%, 18.5%,18.3%, 18.3%, and 17.8% respectively. I also found the 
reports from 1965, 1973, 1981, 1985, 1988, and 1991 for Ruhengeri prefecture in which Tutsi 
represented 0.8%, 0.7%, 0.7%, 0.7%, 0.6%, and 0.6% of the population respectively. The 
proportion of Tutsi reported in the local administrative data then remained reasonably stable 
over twenty-five years. Importantly, the first reports, from 1965, predate the introduction of 
Habyarimana’s ethnic quotas in the 1970s when the ethnic balance would have become 
politicized. The trend in the local data then does not suggest any sudden, large, or otherwise 
suspicious shift in the Tutsi proportion. The observed gradual decline over time likely reflects 
                                                        
15 The 1959 population estimate comes from Office de l’Information et des Relations Publiques pour 
le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi, (1959), 33, cited in Reyntjens, Pouvoir Et Droit Au Rwanda: Droit Public Et Évolution 
Politique, 1916-1973, 21. 
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the lower Tutsi female fertility rate.16 At least as an indicator of the Tutsi proportion, the local 
administrative data then appear reasonably reliable.  
 
Did the 1991 National Census Underestimate the Tutsi Population? 
I compared the national census data against the local data I had for Ruhengeri prefecture for 31 
December 1991, adjusted to 15-16 August 1991, the national census reference date. To ensure 
data comparability, I counted only Rwandan citizens who were resident and physically present in 
their household on the census reference date. Two main findings emerge. First, the overall 
population matched reasonably well. The national census put Ruhengeri’s population at 741,705; 
the date-adjusted local census data predicted a population of 734,697. The difference, 0.95%, is 
not inconsequential, though some of the difference may be attributable to the adjustment using 
the average historical population growth rate (3.1% p.a. for Ruhengeri) or simply lower 
administrative capacity and efficiency at the local level. Second, and more interestingly, the 
national census reported the Hutu population higher and the Tutsi and Twa population 
significantly lower than in the local data. In relative terms, the Hutu population was overstated 
by 1.07% and the Tutsi and Twa understated by 14.48% and 9.20% respectively. Insofar as 
Ruhengeri prefecture was not exceptional, it does appear then the national census did under-
count the Tutsi.  
Was this undercounting the result of deliberate central manipulation of the data or 
individuals mispresenting their ethnicity to census enumerators? The data do not permit a 
conclusive answer. However, it is worth noting that the number of ethnic Twa were under-
counted as well as the number of Tutsi. If the rationale for central manipulation was to reverse 
Tutsi over-representation in educational establishments and the civil service, this would suggest 
the cause was local self-identification as Hutu rather than central government manipulation. The 
Twa were a historically marginalized group and were likely under-represented in the public sector 
and education. Both Tutsi and Twa had incentives to identify as Hutu because of the 
advantageous status it afforded. 
 
Establishing the Tutsi Pre-Genocide Baseline 
Given the stability over time in the population share of Tutsi in the local administrative data, 
they represent a potentially valuable alternative source to the national census for estimating the 
pre-genocide Tutsi population. The only year for which I had administrative population data for 
                                                        
16 Using data from the Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey for 1991, I calculated Hutu women had on average 
6.2 children in their lifetime, whereas Tutsi women had only 5.1. 
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all eleven prefectures was 1983.17 In 1983, the national proportion (excluding foreigners) of Tutsi 
was 10.8%. It is worth noting that the Tutsi proportions for Butare and Ruhengeri prefectures 
were 18.34% and 0.66%, in line with the other administrative censuses going back to 1965. The 
administrative data for 1983 then did not appear unusual. If we assume the 1991 national census 
correctly stated Rwanda’s overall population, and only misstated the ethnic balance between 
Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, then if we extrapolate the census data forward from August 15th 1991 to 
April 6th 1994 (966 days) using the national annual population growth rate of 3.1%, Rwanda’s 
overall population on the eve of the genocide would have been approximately 7,415,000 
persons.18 This figure refers to Rwandan citizens who were resident and present in their usual 
household on the census reference date.19 If the Tutsi population were 10.8% of this figure, I 
estimate roughly 800,000 Tutsi were living within Rwanda on the eve of the genocide.  
 
How Many Tutsi Survivors Were There? 
To my knowledge, there have been two widely-cited but significantly different survivor 
estimates. The first estimate of 150,000 is the aggregation of three other estimates: (i) an 
anonymous international civil servant’s estimate of Tutsi living in refugee camps in July 1994 
(105,000); (ii) an unsupported estimate of 25,000 Tutsi inside Rwanda who did not go to the 
camps; and (iii) another unsupported estimate of 20,000 Tutsi who escaped to Tanzania and 
Zaire.20 The second estimate of 309,000 is based on a 2006 national census, conducted by the 
National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR), a Rwandan governmental body.21 It asked the 
local heads (responsables) of Rwanda’s smallest administrative unit, the imidugudu, to enumerate the 
survivor households in their communities. To these two well-known estimates, I add a third 
estimate of 202,000 based on the Rwandan government’s gacaca data. Rwanda’s gacaca courts were 
an innovative community justice institution established by the government with the stated aims 
of holding to account local perpetrators, establishing the truth of what transpired in those 
communities, and assisting in reconciliation. Local communities compiled extensive information 
                                                        
17 The 1983 administrative data were summarized and submitted in May 2005 as exhibit 2D49 in the trial of 
Bizimungu et al., ICTR-99-50-T. The data were compiled for the Defense by expert witness, Rwandan 
anthropologist, Professor Deo Mbonyinkebe.  
18 The annual national population growth rate of 3.1% is calculated for the period 1978-1991. See Government of 
Rwanda, Récensement Général De La Population Et De L'habitat Au Août 1991: Résultats Définitifs, 13. 
19 I consider only Rwandans who were present on the census reference night of August 15th 1991 in order to ensure 
comparability with the 1983 administrative data. The summary of the administrative census data in my possession 
reported only the population of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. Non-Rwandans were not reported. Administrative censuses 
also generally reported only present individuals. Individuals temporarily absent (away for less than 6 months) were not 
reported. If both Rwandan and non-Rwandans, and both individuals present and absent on the census reference night 
were counted, the overall population of Rwanda on 6 April 1994 would have been approximately 7,761,000. 
20 See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994, 264; Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 17. 
21 See Government of Rwanda, Récensement Des Rescapés Du Genocide De 1994: Rapport Final (Kigali: Institut National 
de la Statistique du Rwanda, 2008). 
 9 
on the genocide as part of gacaca and the Rwandan government published a summary of some of 
these data in 2007.22 They included the number of survivors in local communities.  
My assessment of the reliability of each estimate is varied. The first estimate of 150,000, 
although the most longstanding, has the least well-documented empirical basis to it. Two of the 
three estimates on which it depends – essentially the number of Tutsi outside of the refugee 
camps – appear to be educated guesses with no evidence offered to support them. I must regard 
it then as the least reliable. This leaves the two government estimates between which the 
difference, 107,000, is still very large. I had field data that allowed me to ground-truth the 
accuracy of the smaller, gacaca estimate of 202,000 survivors. Specifically, I had data on the 
number of Tutsi resident and the number of Tutsi killed in 20 administrative sectors in 
Ruhengeri and Butare prefectures that had been part of the initial gacaca pilot exercise. 
Importantly, I had collected these data in 2003 directly from the pilot communities themselves 
before the data had been passed to the national-level authorities charged with their compilation. 
These data were based on handwritten lists drawn up by the community enumerating the entire 
sector population and also those killed by name. I viewed them as reliable. I could calculate with 
confidence how many Tutsi survived in these particular 20 sectors. Comparing these numbers 
against the 2007 national gacaca data, however, shows almost no correspondence. For 10 sectors, 
the national gacaca data understated the number of survivors by an average of 19.6%. For the 
other 10 sectors, the national data more troublingly overstated the number by an average of 
48.6%. I conclude then that the 2007 national gacaca estimate of 202,000 survivors is also 
unreliable. 
This leaves the reliability of the 2006 survivor census of 309,000 individuals to assess. 
Government estimates will inevitably be vulnerable to the charge of manipulation for political 
purposes. In this instance, however, there may have been little incentive to inflate the figure. The 
survivor census was not undertaken by the FARG, the government agency charged with assisting 
survivors and whose budget would depend on their number. It was conducted by the formally 
independent Rwandan statistics agency. A very high survivor number would also call into 
question the government’s claim of one million Tutsi dead, a number that has greater political 
importance for it. In my view, the risk that the survivor data had been exaggerated for political 
purposes was small. The main concern with this figure, however, is its definition of a survivor. 
The census uses an expansive definition: “Any person pursued for his ethnic affiliation, his 
ideology, or that of a family member, against divisionism, exclusionism, or extermination, and 
                                                        
22 The Rwandan government’s webpage on which the gacaca summary report was released is no longer active. 
However, Marijke Verpoorten, one of the contributors to this forum, downloaded the report before it went offline 
and entered the data electronically. She generously shared the dataset with me.  
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who escaped massacres and genocides committed between October 1 1990 and December 31 
1994.”23 Survivors then could include individuals killed before April 1994 and also persons who 
were not Tutsi. One of the most important groups subsumed within this broad definition were 
the Hutu widows and widowers of Tutsi partners. The census enumerated 31,776 widows and 
widowers, 10.3% of all survivors. It did not, however, distinguish their ethnicity. If we assume, 
albeit an unlikely possibility, all of them were Hutu, the lower bound for the number of Tutsi 
survivors would become 277,592. My best overall estimate for the number of Tutsi genocide 
survivors then is between 278,000 and 309,000 individuals. 
 
How many Tutsi were killed during the genocide? 
 
Subtracting the best estimate of the number of survivors from the best estimate of the 
pre-genocide Tutsi population, I believe the number of Tutsi killed during the genocide lies 
between 491,000 and 522,000 individuals. If accurate, then nearly two-thirds of Rwanda’s Tutsi 
population were exterminated between April and July 1994. The finding should leave little doubt 
as to whether the violence amounted to genocide. 
 
How Many Hutu were Killed During the Genocide? 
Establishing the number of Hutu killed during the genocide matters for three key reasons: it 
shapes the characterization of the violence; it raises questions of the experience of memory and 
justice following the genocide; and, by extension, it has implications for the possibilities of 
interethnic reconciliation. The number has been central then to debates over whether the 
violence amounted to a double genocide or a politicide; whether Rwanda has experienced 
victor’s justice and institutionalized an asymmetric public commemoration of the victims; and 
whether the country has successfully escaped the risk of renewed ethnic violence.  
I do not have new data to improve upon the estimates already in the public domain for 
the number of Hutu killed during the genocide period. Scholarly attention has focused in 
particular on Hutu civilians killed by rebel forces, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), as they 
advanced and captured territory. Two of the more widely-cited estimates, by the late Alison Des 
Forges of Human Rights Watch, and Robert Gersony, a UN consultant who conducted a field 
investigation in 1994 but whose report was not officially released, put the figure at between 
25,000-30,000 and 25,000 - 45,000 respectively.24 These estimates should be seen as a lower 
                                                        
23 Government of Rwanda, Récensement Des Rescapés Du Genocide De 1994, 3. Author’s translation from French.  
24 For both estimates, see Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 17 & 558. 
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bound. Gersony visited only 41 of 145 communes inside Rwanda. Davenport and Stam have 
also estimated as many as 80,000 persons may have been killed in RPF-controlled areas.25 There 
is also evidence of Hutu killed for other reasons in this time period: the assassinations of political 
moderates; combatant deaths between two armed groups; interpersonal disputes, often land-
related, between ordinary Rwandans; and the targeting of individuals considered sympathetic to 
Tutsi. We have little systematic evidence of these deaths. Verwimp conducted a survey that 
included 1620 Hutu across three Rwandan prefectures. He found forty-three Hutu (2.7%) 
suffered violent deaths of whom twenty-one were killed by the RPA, nine by Hutu militia, one 
by Rwandan government soldiers, five by other, unspecified individuals, and eight by authors 
unknown. In general, however, the deaths of all these non-Tutsi Rwandans in this time period 
remain poorly documented and estimates will unlikely improve much until investigations with a 
view to a judicial accounting for them are initiated. The current and limited evidence we do have 
of Hutu civilian deaths in this time period does not, in my view, support claims of a double 
genocide or a politicide. It also does not challenge the evidence that a genocide against Tutsi 
took place. It does serve to underscore, however, that forms of violence other than genocide 
occurred at the same time in Rwanda for which there has been limited recognition. The exclusive 
focus on the genocide unfortunately obscures this other violence. 
I have purposely limited discussion of the Hutu death toll to the period 6 April to 19 July 
1994, and to violence within Rwanda, as this is generally recognized as the time, and place, in 
which the Rwandan genocide occurred. The estimate I offered for the Tutsi death toll equally 
relates to this time period and to events inside Rwanda. However, it would be remiss not to 
consider how the death toll would change if these particular temporal and spatial boundaries 
were drawn differently. There have been major episodes of violence claiming the lives of non-
Tutsi Rwandans both before and after the genocide, and both inside and outside of Rwanda. 
These events did not occur independently of each other, at least not in the minds of the parties 
involved in them. Straus has proposed a useful periodization of this violence, along with possible 
death tolls.26 Six time periods are distinguishable: (i) the civil war leading up to president 
Habyarimana’s assassination (October 1990 to April 1994); (ii) the genocide itself (April to July 
1994); (iii) the consolidation of power by the RPF (August 1994-1995); (iv) the pursuit of Hutu 
refugees in the D.R.C. (1996-97); (v) the insurgency and counterinsurgency in Rwanda’s north-
west (1997-98); and (vi) authoritarian repression inside Rwanda (2000 onwards). Aggregating the 
various estimates offered for these episodes, excluding the genocide, places the death toll of non-
                                                        
25 See Christian Davenport and Allan Stam, "Rwandan Political Violence in Space and Time" (Unpublished 
manuscript). Available at https://genodynamics.weebly.com/writings.html, accessed 17 June 2019.  
26 See Straus, "The Limits of a Genocide Lens: Violence against Rwandans in the 1990s," 7-12. 
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Tutsi Rwandans in the several hundreds of thousands. The most significant of these is the 
systematic targeting of Hutu refugees in the D.R.C., for which the strongest claim of a second 
genocide has been made.27 In comparison with the genocide against the Tutsi, all these episodes 
have received far less recognition; the estimates of their death tolls are much more imprecise; 
and, most troublingly, accountability for them has been woefully limited.  
 
Conclusion 
I have estimated between 491,000 and 522,000 Tutsi, nearly two thirds of Rwanda’s pre-genocide 
Tutsi population, were killed between 6 April and 19 July 1994. I calculated this death toll by 
subtracting my estimate of between 278,000 and 309,000 Tutsi survivors from my estimate of a 
baseline Tutsi population of almost exactly 800,000, or 10.8% of the overall population, on the 
eve of the genocide. My estimate is in line with Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) early estimate of 
507,000, though HRW relied on the 1991 national census to estimate a pre-genocide Tutsi 
population of 657,000 and assumed there were 150,000 survivors. It is somewhat lower than 
Verpoorten’s figures of 512,000 to 662,000 Tutsi dead, who estimated a pre-genocide Tutsi 
population of 812,000, using the 1987 administrative census data where Tutsi represented 10.6% 
of the population, and that the number of survivors lay between 150,000 and 300,000.28 My 
estimate is also lower than Prunier’s figure of 800,000-850,000, who assumed Tutsi represented 
12% of the population and that only 130,000 Tutsi survived.29  
In comparison with estimates at the higher and lower ends, my estimate is significantly 
lower than the Government of Rwanda’s genocide census figure of 1,006,031 Tutsi killed. I 
believe this number is not credible. If added to the government’s own survivor census of 
309,000 persons (assuming all were Tutsi), it would require the Tutsi to have constituted 1.3 
million or 17.8% of Rwanda’s pre-genocide population, a proportion slightly higher than that in 
the colonial era. This in turn would imply the exodus of (mainly) Tutsi during and after 
Rwanda’s revolution (1959-62) did not take place and would leave the size of the Tutsi refugee 
                                                        
27 The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious 
Violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law Committed within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo between March 1993 and June 2003 (2010), presents the results of the most serious investigation into the violence 
in the D.R.C. in this time period so far. The report does not conclude whether the violence qualified as genocide, 
stating this requires a judicial determination, but does state in paragraph 31 several incidents occurred “…from 
which a court could infer the intention to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in the DRC in part…” In Straus, "The 
Limits of a Genocide Lens: Violence against Rwandans in the 1990s," 11, a stronger assessment is offered: “In my 
view, of the four episodes of violence described in this essay, the sustained, large-scale violence against the Rwandan 
Hutu population in the Democratic Republic of Congo is the one that could warrant the label of “genocide.”  
28 Verpoorten’s estimate and detailed explanation of how she derived it may be found in an online opinion piece at 
https://africanarguments.org/2014/10/27/rwanda-why-davenport-and-stams-calculation-that-200000-tutsi-died-in-
the-genocide-is-wrong-by-marijke-verpoorten/, accessed 15 June 2019. 
29 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994, 265. 
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population before the genocide unexplained. In contrast, my estimate is significantly higher than 
Davenport and Stam’s estimate of between 206,000 to 376,000 Tutsi killed. While they believe 
the number of survivors lies between 130,000 and 300,000 as several others do, they rely on a 
much lower pre-genocide Tutsi population of 506,000.30 This figure is extrapolated from the 
1952 colonial census, taking into account UNHCR data on refugees from the revolution, and 
using a population growth rate of 2.5% per annum up until 1990 when the war begins. The 
figure of 506,000 Tutsi in Rwanda in April 1994, however, is dubious. It is sensitive to the 
UNHCR estimates of the number of Rwandan refugees in the region, and to the assumed 
population growth rate. The reliability of the UNHCR data has already been investigated and 
questioned given dramatic fluctuations in the figures over time that remain unexplained.31 It is 
also significantly lower than the Rwandan national census’ figure which puts the number at 
597,000 in August 1991 or 645,000 in April 1994. These figures are themselves already widely-
seen as an under-estimate. 
Genocide is an intrinsically exclusionary concept. The desire to reserve the unique moral 
and abhorrent nature of the term genocide for the victim group, and to resist claims by others 
who suffered violence also to be recognized as genocide victims, is powerful. The Rwandan 
government’s decision to specify in the constitution the genocide was specifically against the 
Tutsi exemplifies this exclusionary and proprietary urge. The several estimates for the death toll 
offered in this forum, however, should leave little doubt that a genocide targeting Tutsi occurred. 
The investment of significant scholarly resources into establishing the genocide’s toll is a 
worthwhile exercise both for the production of a historical record and for reasons of memory, 
justice, and accountability. However, the violence that claimed Rwandan lives in the 1990s was 
varied and complex. Other forms of violence took place in Rwanda at the same time as the 
genocide. Other forms of violence also preceded and followed the genocide, both inside and 
outside of Rwanda, that are linked to it, at least in the minds of those who were its targets. In 
setting a future research agenda, scholars should consider the value of committing resources to 
                                                        
30 The survivor figures of 130,000-300,000 are cited in Davenport and Stam, "Rwandan Political Violence in Space 
and Time." The pre-genocide Tutsi population estimate of 506,000 is cited on their project website in a Powerpoint 
presentation Stam made in 2012 (slide 18). https://genodynamics.weebly.com/presentations.html, accessed 15 June 
2019. In the BBC documentary Rwanda’s Untold Story, Davenport and Stam are interviewed and Stam repeats the 
estimate that 200,000 Tutsi may have been killed (at minute 31.05) and the narrator also repeats their estimate of a 
pre-genocide Tutsi population of 500,000. However, in an online magazine article, Davenport and Stam cite a 
different Tutsi death toll of 300,000-500,000 based on a different pre-genocide Tutsi population extrapolated from 
the 1991 national census. See https://psmag.com/social-justice/what-really-happened-in-rwanda-3432, accessed 17 
June 2019.  
31 See Guichaoua, Le Problème Des Réfugiés Rwandais Et Des Populations Banyarwanda Dans La Région Des Grands Lacs 
Africains, 20-24. 
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documenting the victims of these other kinds of violence. They too deserve to be remembered, 
and they too deserve justice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
